The 4 Freedoms Library
2024-03-28T14:40:49Z
Alan Lake
http://4freedoms.com/profile/AlanLake
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Travelling in Iraq and Turkey - with Sister Hatune
tag:4freedoms.com,2016-04-09:3766518:Topic:177494
2016-04-09T17:30:49.419Z
Alan Lake
http://4freedoms.com/profile/AlanLake
<h3 class="module-title">TRAVELLING IN IRAQ 9 - 16 FEBRUARY 2016</h3>
<p><strong><em>Author, Hatune Dogan</em></strong></p>
<p><em><strong>Dear friends,</strong></em></p>
<p>My recent visit began in Frankfurt. The goal was Erbil in Iraq. A young Swedish journalist, Sanna Hill, joined me on the expedition. She had long wanted to experience the situation in the Middle East and with her own eyes see what our organization does for the people there.</p>
<p><img alt="Sanna-1" class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-4700" height="467" src="http://hatunefoundation.com/international/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Sanna-1.jpg" width="700"></img> <em>Sanna Hill in Shingal –…</em></p>
<h3 class="module-title">TRAVELLING IN IRAQ 9 - 16 FEBRUARY 2016</h3>
<p><strong><em>Author, Hatune Dogan</em></strong></p>
<p><em><strong>Dear friends,</strong></em></p>
<p>My recent visit began in Frankfurt. The goal was Erbil in Iraq. A young Swedish journalist, Sanna Hill, joined me on the expedition. She had long wanted to experience the situation in the Middle East and with her own eyes see what our organization does for the people there.</p>
<p><img class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-4700" src="http://hatunefoundation.com/international/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Sanna-1.jpg" alt="Sanna-1" width="700" height="467"/><em>Sanna Hill in Shingal – February 2016 – Foto: Private</em></p>
<p>After arrival, we went directly to Ankawa, a village outside Erbil. Approximately 4000 Christians now live there as refugees in their own country. Most of them fled when the Islamic State terrorists attacked Mosul, 18 months ago. Since then they have been moving around, before they finally arrived here.</p>
<p><strong>THE DEPRESSION</strong></p>
<p>In Ankawa the refugees live densely packed in tents, containers and abandoned warehouses. They feel quite safe within the group, but a pervasive atmosphere of depression is evident. These people’s greatest desire is to return to their homes although most of them realize, that this will never happen. Many are seriously ill, most children are suffering from some kind of infection and half of the elderly have diabetes.</p>
<p><img class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-4701" src="http://hatunefoundation.com/international/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/DSC_0486.jpg" alt="DSC_0486" width="1000" height="666"/>They get no help from the government. The most necessary help is delivered by different churches and private aid organizations. This time we – Hatune Foundation – could contribute with medicine, clothing and money with the help of our local association.</p>
<p>After coming back from Ankawa, we had arranged to meet two German TV teams in Dohuk. Together we continued the trip and went into the Shingal mountains. Our aim was to visit some of the many refugees that since August 2014 still lives in the wilderness without any real resources. It is a stunning amount of people who are affected – more than 30,000 families; most of them Yazidis!</p>
<p><img class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-4702" src="http://hatunefoundation.com/international/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/DSC_0614.jpg" alt="DSC_0614" width="1000" height="666"/></p>
<p><strong>PEOPLE WITHOUT SUPPORT</strong></p>
<p>It is the Kurdish Peshmerga – the national military force – that controls the area. We were not even allowed to deliver the emergency relief there without their permission! A local politician from Shingal, who also works as an administrator for the Peshmerga, reluctantly gave us permission to enter the area.</p>
<p>“<em>Don’t support these people</em>!” he said, but never explained why. The Yazidis don’t have any agreements with the local authorities. They have no greater confidence in any of the groups who are forming the Peshmerga. Peshmerga on the other hand believes that anyone that helps Yazidis and Christians is an enemy to their chief Barzani and the Turkish President, Mr Erdogan.</p>
<p><img class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-4703" src="http://hatunefoundation.com/international/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/DSC_0639-utsnit.jpg" alt="DSC_0639-utsnit" width="794" height="592"/></p>
<p>We had beforehand done our best to find out what those people needed most of all. At this time of year, the greatest challenge is the cold. We packed our vehicles with blankets, gas, soap, detergent and other supplies, things that we maybe don’t realize the importance of at home.</p>
<p>When we drove into the villages we saw children with hands, and faces, blue from the cold, smiling at us with expectantly eyes. Moments like this make life easier – even in the hardest of times. In addition to the warming and purifying supplies, which was received with great joy and gratitude, we also provided survival money to many of the 2000 families who we had the privilege to help on this trip<em>. A trip that wasn’t without dangers.</em></p>
<p>Only three hours before we arrived to our destination, a rocket attack from the neighboring village had caused panic. Even if no one was killed, many became ill after the attack and suffered vomiting and nausea and many believed that the enemy had used chemical weapons.</p>
<p>Despite the fact that the Islamic State has lost many of its territories since their major successes in 2014-15, they are still in control over nine villages around Shingal City. The local Yazidis, believe that Peshmerga, who actually controls the area, has made an agreement with IS. They also call Erdogan<em>“the devil who is spinning the wheel”</em> and say that IS get their weapons, even rockets, from Erdogan himself.<strong> </strong></p>
<p><strong>A COUNTRY IN RUINS</strong></p>
<p><img class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-4704" src="http://hatunefoundation.com/international/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/land-i-ruiner.jpg" alt="land-i-ruiner" width="777" height="518"/>After our visit to the mountain villages we went through Shingal City, today completely destroyed. Only the houses of Muslims stand untouched after the IS terrorists has left the city. Again we hear reports that says that not a single shot was fired during “the liberation” of Shingal city and that IS and Peshmerga had an agreement that the IS would retreat in a controlled manner. Although, before IS withdrew – regardless of how it happened – according to several witnesses, they destroyed the houses that belonged to the Christians and Yazidis. </p>
<p><strong>WHERE THE OIL FLOWS</strong></p>
<p><img class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-4705" src="http://hatunefoundation.com/international/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Tank-konvoj.jpg" alt="Tank-konvoj" width="590" height="332"/>On our way back to Erbil we passed about sixty large tankers, all with Turkish registration plates. Here in the middle of Peshmerga controlled area we had the chance to, with our own eyes, witness what the media has reported about lately. The oil traffic between Iraq (from IS controlled area) and Turkey actually occurs. It seems like the terror organization also in this matter made an agreement with Peshmerga and Turkey!</p>
<p><strong>A SAD MEETING</strong></p>
<p>Once again back in Turkey, we visited our partners in Mardin. They needed money to help some of the Christian Syrian refugees who live there. After taking care of that, we had a long conversation with an elderly Christian woman from Iraq. She had cancer and her story touched us all deeply.</p>
<p>Together with 45 Christian families she lived in captivity of the IS for nine months. They were forced to drink contaminated water and eat food mixed with drugs. Each day they had to face the most abhorrent forms of torture. Their executioners demanded that they should convert to Islam.</p>
<p>They repeatedly pressed a knife against her throat, or held a gun to her head, crying out their threats while she refused and screamed, that she would rather die than abide.</p>
<p>However, that wasn’t the worst. More and more girls, among the captured, were forced to become sex slaves. The cynical IS-barbarians gave them the news by saying to the victims:<em>“Today you will become the bride of our master!”</em></p>
<p><img class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-4706" src="http://hatunefoundation.com/international/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/DSC_0196.jpg" alt="DSC_0196" width="1000" height="666"/>Their Nightmare came to an end when a bishop heard about their captivity and, through intermediaries, paid a larger ransom.</p>
<p>Even though they are now safe, the woman begged us to tell her story and show her face to the world, as a symbol of the evil and the destruction that the IS beasts are spreading.</p>
<p><strong>ISLAMISTS IN TURKISH UNIFORMS</strong></p>
<p>Our next stop was supposed to be Cizre, a Kurdish city in Turkey on the border to Iraq. The people who live there, hate Erdogan and are all dreaming of a separate state. Unfortunately, it wasn’t possible to go there. The police stopped us and forced us to return. The city has been closed by the Turkish military.</p>
<p>Since we weren’t allowed to go any further we started talking with the residents right where we were. With wild gestures they explained the situation. For several weeks, the Turkish army had been attacking many Kurdish villages in the area, and the reports talked about many dead and wounded.</p>
<p>The most remarkable thing was how they described the government forces. Even if they wore Turkish uniforms they looked exactly like the terrorists from the Islamic State with their long beards. The residents also told us that these soldiers are referred to as mercenaries from various countries like Chechnya and Afghanistan. Obviously the Turkish military recruits these young Muslim men in the refugee camps in Turkey.</p>
<p><strong>THE HIJAB IS BACK</strong></p>
<p>The following day we continued our journey and went to Midyat, where our brave driver lives. He had been driving us around in the hostile terrain for several days, without any fear. A couple of times just a few meters from the enemy territory. When we came to his home he was lovingly welcomed by his twelve-year-old daughter. To our surprise she was, at this young age, already forced to hide behind the hijab so only the face could be seen.</p>
<p>“<em>She has to</em>“, our driver let us know with a sad face. “<em>It’s now mandatory in Eastern Turkey, Erdogan decided</em>” he adds.</p>
<p>With this decision Erdogan goes against the Turkish constitution and the protests are few. Adult women are encouraged to wear headscarves and in return they receive payment from the Turkish Government. People call it “veil-compensation”. The general impression is that the Islamization of Turkey is in rapid progress and that people are getting worse and worse off.</p>
<p><img class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-4707" src="http://hatunefoundation.com/international/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/DSC_0505..jpg" alt="DSC_0505." width="1000" height="666"/> </p>
<p><em>Dear Friends,</em></p>
<p><em>I know that there isn’t many good news here!</em></p>
<p><em>Although, we have tried to shed some light to the people who are forced to live in the rough reality there. The feedback we received where ever we came, gave us hope and comfort and convinced me that we succeeded this time!</em></p>
<p><em>But the goal is still far away – that all the suffering people can return to their lives, for real.</em></p>
<p><strong><em>Getting no government support, we are in great need of your help to be able to help the most vulnerable among our fellow citizens in this hostile corner in the world!</em></strong></p>
<p><em>Warburg 18 February 2016<br/></em><br/><img class="wp-image-4708 alignnone" src="http://hatunefoundation.com/international/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Hatunes-signatur.png" alt="Hatunes-signatur" width="140" height="35"/><br/><em>Sister Hatune Dogan</em></p>
<hr/><p> <strong><span>Please support our work for the poor and persecuted.<br/>Hit the PayPal button and be a part of our great community!</span><br/></strong><br/>Or go to: <a href="http://hatunefoundation.com/international/">http://hatunefoundation.com/international/</a></p>
<p><strong><em>If you have any comments, please mail me:<a href="https://mail.google.com/mail/?view=cm&fs=1&tf=1&to=director@hatunefoundation.com" target="_blank">director@hatunefoundation.com</a> </em></strong></p>
Inside Mosul: What's life like under Islamic State?
tag:4freedoms.com,2015-06-22:3766518:Topic:168239
2015-06-22T01:15:42.284Z
Alan Lake
http://4freedoms.com/profile/AlanLake
<h1 class="story-body__h1">Inside Mosul: What's life like under Islamic State?</h1>
<div class="story-body__mini-info-list-and-share"><ul class="mini-info-list">
<li class="mini-info-list__item"><div class="date date--v2">9 June 2015</div>
</li>
</ul>
</div>
<div class="story-body__inner"><img alt="Images from inside Mosul" class="js-image-replace" height="549" src="http://ichef.bbci.co.uk/news/976/media/images/83483000/jpg/_83483927_triple_grabs_976.jpg" width="976"></img><p class="story-body__introduction">Exclusive footage reveals how Islamic State wields power over people's everyday lives in Iraq's second city, Mosul, a year after it was captured.</p>
<p>Secretly…</p>
</div>
<h1 class="story-body__h1">Inside Mosul: What's life like under Islamic State?</h1>
<div class="story-body__mini-info-list-and-share"><ul class="mini-info-list">
<li class="mini-info-list__item"><div class="date date--v2">9 June 2015</div>
</li>
</ul>
</div>
<div class="story-body__inner"><img class="js-image-replace" alt="Images from inside Mosul" src="http://ichef.bbci.co.uk/news/976/media/images/83483000/jpg/_83483927_triple_grabs_976.jpg" width="976" height="549"/>
<p class="story-body__introduction">Exclusive footage reveals how Islamic State wields power over people's everyday lives in Iraq's second city, Mosul, a year after it was captured.</p>
<p>Secretly filmed videos obtained by the BBC's Ghadi Sary show mosques being blown up, abandoned schools, and women being forced to cover up their bodies.</p>
<p>Residents said they were living in fear of punishment according to the group's extreme interpretation of Islamic law.</p>
<p>They also described IS preparations for an expected government offensive.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-27778112" class="story-body__link">The fall of Mosul</a> marked the start of a lightning advance across the north that saw the army routed and hundreds of thousands of people forced to flee their homes.</p>
<p><strong>1. Control of women</strong></p>
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<p>The videos, filmed over several months last year, reveal the reality of life under IS. The first series shows how women are forced to cover up, with one woman challenged for not having her hands fully covered.</p>
<div class="ai2rwd-54247 ai2rwd-54247--976">Woman chastised over lack of glovesNineveh StreetMosulBaghdadIS controlIS supportIRAQSYRIAKURDISH-GOVERNEDAREASMosul</div>
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<span class="off-screen">Media caption</span><span class="media-caption__text">Women are forced to cover up entirely</span><br />
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<p><strong>Hanaa:</strong> "IS is very strict about the dress code for women. Women have to be fully covered up in black, head to toe.</p>
<p>"One day I felt so bored at home that I asked my husband to take me out, even if I had to wear the full khimar [a long, cape-like veil that covers the hair, neck and shoulders completely, but leaves the face clear]. I had not left home since IS took over the city. As I was preparing, he told me I would be forced to put on a niqab [veil for the face]. I was shocked at this and considered staying at home for a moment, but eventually I relented.</p>
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<div class="quote-inner"><blockquote class="quote">I saw a father searching for his daughter, who was concealed in a sea of blacknessHanaa</blockquote>
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<p>"We went to a nice restaurant by the river we used to frequent during our engagement. As soon as we sat down, my husband told me that I could finally reveal my face as there was no IS presence and the restaurant was a place for families.</p>
<p>"I was very happy to oblige and so I revealed my face with a large smile. Instantly, the restaurant's owner came over begging my husband to ask me to hide it again because Islamic State fighters made surprise inspection visits and he would be flogged if they saw me like that.</p>
<p>"We had heard stories of men being flogged because their wives didn't put their gloves on. Another woman's parents were banned from driving their car. Those who objected would be beaten and humiliated.</p>
<p>"We complied with the owner's request. I started wondering about how ignorant and merciless the state of affairs had become. As we left the restaurant, I saw a father searching for his daughter, who was concealed in a sea of blackness."</p>
<p><strong>2. Persecution of minorities</strong></p>
<img src="http://ichef.bbci.co.uk/news/660/media/images/82497000/gif/_82497522_line.gif" class="js-image-replace" alt="null" width="464" height="1"/><br />
<p>The footage, which was passed from house to house before being smuggled out of the city, reveals how homes belonging to Mosul's ethnic and religious minority communities have been confiscated by Islamic State. Many residential areas once popular with minorities now stand empty.</p>
<div class="ai2rwd-75012 ai2rwd-75012--976">Christian homes marked with 'N'ArabiMosulBaghdadIS controlIS supportIRAQSYRIAKURDISH-GOVERNEDAREASMosul</div>
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<span class="off-screen">Media caption</span><span class="media-caption__text">Many Christian neighbourhoods are now empty</span><br />
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<p><strong>Mariam, a gynaecologist who is a Christian: </strong>"I'm known to be an avid reader and own a large collection of books. My collection kept on growing as friends and family leaving Iraq used to send me their books because they knew I wasn't going to leave and that I would take care of them.</p>
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<div class="quote-inner"><blockquote class="quote">I escaped with my body unharmed, but my soul remained where I had left it: at home with my booksMariam</blockquote>
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<p>"I was threatened and harassed [by Sunni extremists] before the capture of Mosul, but I kept on delivering babies for women from all religions and sects. I never differentiate between my patients as I believe everyone deserves equal care.</p>
<p>"However, I had to flee as Mosul fell. I escaped with my body unharmed, but my soul remained where I had left it: at home with my books.</p>
<p>"After moving to Irbil [in Iraq's Kurdistan region] I received shocking news: Islamic State had confiscated my house and marked it with the letter 'N' [for Nasrani - a word used by IS to refer to Christians]. I immediately telephoned my friends in Mosul and begged them to save my books.</p>
<p>"But it was too late. They called back saying my library had been emptied onto the street. However, some of my neighbours were able to rescue some precious books that remain hidden."</p>
<p><strong>3. Intimidation, punishment and torture</strong></p>
<img src="http://ichef.bbci.co.uk/news/660/media/images/82497000/gif/_82497522_line.gif" class="js-image-replace" alt="null" width="464" height="1"/><br />
<p>Clips also show mosques and shrines being destroyed. Residents speak of brutal punishments for anyone contravening the jihadists' interpretation of Islamic law, which is imposed across the "caliphate" whose creation they proclaimed weeks after seizing Mosul.</p>
<div class="ai2rwd-694 ai2rwd-694--976">Yahya Abu al-Qassim shrineNabi Jirjis mosqueNabi Yunus mosqueMosulBaghdadIS controlIS supportIRAQSYRIAKURDISH-GOVERNEDAREASMosul</div>
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<span class="off-screen">Media caption</span><span class="media-caption__text">IS militants have blown up mosques and shrines</span><br />
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<p><strong>Zaid: </strong>"Since IS took the city, it has been applying the 'Laws of the Caliphate', as it calls them. The minimum punishment is flogging, which is applied for things like smoking a cigarette.</p>
<p>"Theft is punished by amputating a hand, adultery by men by throwing the offender from a high building, and adultery by women by stoning to death. The punishments are carried out in public to intimidate people, who are often forced to watch.</p>
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<div class="quote-inner"><blockquote class="quote">They tortured me... The guy who did it wouldn't stop unless he got tiredFouad</blockquote>
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<p>"I know many people who have been arrested by IS. Some of them are my relatives. Some were killed because they were in the security services. Others have been released. They tell unimaginable stories of atrocities committed by IS in its prisons.</p>
<p>"Many who come out prefer not to speak. They stay silent, because they're terrified that if they speak, they'll be rearrested."</p>
<p><strong>Fouad: </strong>"I was arrested by IS. They came to our family home looking for my brother. When they couldn't find him, they decided to take me to prison instead.</p>
<p>"Then they tortured me. The guy who did it wouldn't stop unless he got tired. He was edgy all the time and he wouldn't listen to what his prisoners said. He flogged me with a power cable and also tortured me psychologically.</p>
<p>"When my brother handed himself in, they found out that the accusations against him were false but they still kept me in prison until they judged me well enough to leave.</p>
<p>"They had hit me so hard with the cable that the marks are still visible on my back."</p>
<p><strong>4. Disruption of daily life</strong></p>
<img src="http://ichef.bbci.co.uk/news/660/media/images/82497000/gif/_82497522_line.gif" class="js-image-replace" alt="null" width="464" height="1"/><br />
<p>Life for the city's residents has changed beyond recognition. The footage reveals how fuel is in short supply, pollution widespread, construction halted and many schools closed.</p>
<div class="ai2rwd-15255 ai2rwd-15255--976">Empty classroomsShurtaCity hit by water shortages and pollutionFifth BridgeInternet services downSukkarConstruction haltedKafaatMosulBaghdadIS controlIS supportKURDISH-GOVERNEDAREASIRAQSYRIALocals collectwood for fuelMosul WoodsMosul</div>
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<span class="off-screen">Media caption</span><span class="media-caption__text">Residents say their lives have been changed beyond recognition.</span><br />
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<p><strong>Hisham:</strong> "Daily life has changed in an indescribable way. Those who were in the military and day labourers no longer have any income because there are no jobs anymore. The rich have been relying on their savings, those with a salary are just about getting by, but the poor have been left to the mercy of God.</p>
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<div class="quote-inner"><blockquote class="quote">My brother was given 20 lashes just because he didn't shut his shop during prayer timeHisham</blockquote>
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<p>"I have lost my job and have been forced to abandon my studies. Like everyone else, I am denied my basic rights. According to IS, everything is 'haram' (forbidden) and so I end up just sitting at home all the time. Even simple leisure activities like picnics are banned now in Mosul, under the pretext that they are a waste of time and money.</p>
<p>"IS takes a quarter of everyone's salary as a contribution towards paying for rebuilding the city. People can't say no because they would face harsh punishments. The group controls everything. Rent is paid to it and the hospitals are for its members' exclusive use.</p>
<p>"The group has even replaced the imams in the mosques with pro-IS people. Many of us have stopped going to the mosques because those attending are asked to give an oath of allegiance and we hate that.</p>
<p>"Meanwhile, my brother was given 20 lashes just because he didn't shut his shop during prayer time - as if you can just impose religion by force!"</p>
<p><strong>5. Indoctrination and surveillance</strong></p>
<img src="http://ichef.bbci.co.uk/news/660/media/images/82497000/gif/_82497522_line.gif" class="js-image-replace" alt="null" width="464" height="1"/><br />
<p>Footage also shows how the militants have used increasingly sophisticated techniques to control the city's population, such as "media points" to disseminate their messages.</p>
<div class="ai2rwd-93083 ai2rwd-93083--976">Video indoctrination at market stallBab al-TubMosulBaghdadIS controlIS supportIRAQSYRIAKURDISH-GOVERNEDAREASMosul</div>
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<span class="off-screen">Media caption</span><span class="media-caption__text">A militant on a bus speaks about his views</span><br />
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<p><strong>Mahmoud: </strong>"My 12-year-old brother remained in school despite the fact that it became controlled by IS. We thought that, with no alternative available, he would at least be able to continue some sort of education, and that it would be better than nothing.</p>
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<div class="quote-inner"><blockquote class="quote">I saw my little brother drawing Islamic State's flag and humming one of their most famous songs... I went crazyMahmoud</blockquote>
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<p>"But one day I came home and found my little brother drawing Islamic State's flag and humming one of its most famous songs. I went crazy and began yelling at him.</p>
<p>"I took the drawing and tore it to pieces in front of him. He got scared, ran to our mother and started crying. I warned him that should he ever draw that flag again or recite one of those people's songs, I would ground him, ban him from seeing his friends and stop talking to him altogether.</p>
<p>"We immediately removed him from school, as we preferred that he had no education at all than the one IS is promoting.</p>
<p>"I've come to the conclusion that the goal of this organisation is to plant the seeds of violence, hate and sectarianism into children's minds."</p>
<p><strong>6. IS tactics and logistics</strong></p>
<img src="http://ichef.bbci.co.uk/news/660/media/images/82497000/gif/_82497522_line.gif" class="js-image-replace" alt="null" width="464" height="1"/><br />
<p>The militants can also be seen moving heavy artillery - some captured from fleeing Iraqi forces - and responding to attacks with anti-aircraft fire.</p>
<div class="ai2rwd-76767 ai2rwd-76767--976">Vehicles with IS markingsMajmuaSecurity tower movedMasarifMosulBaghdadIS controlIS supportIRAQSYRIAKURDISH-GOVERNEDAREASMosul</div>
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<span class="off-screen">Media caption</span><span class="media-caption__text">IS captured equipment from the fleeing Iraqi army</span><br />
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<p><strong>Zaid: </strong>"IS knows the army will try to retake Mosul, so they're taking precautions. They've destroyed the city by digging tunnels, building barricades, planting mines and bombs, and filling the city with snipers, which will make it very difficult for the army.</p>
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<div class="quote-inner"><blockquote class="quote">IS is the enemy of humanityZaid</blockquote>
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<p>"Despite this, if the government manages to take Nineveh Plains and Mosul back I will be very happy. I hope that the internally displaced people and refugees will be able to return so that we can work together to build a safe and united Iraq. IS is the enemy of humanity.</p>
<p>"I do worry about how the army will take the city though. I think the violations committed in Tikrit by the Popular Mobilisation [a pro-government volunteer force comprising mostly Shia militias] are going to happen in the Nineveh Plains and Mosul, and that the whole situation will just be whitewashed again.</p>
<p>"The government should arm local people so that they can protect the city themselves. With the help of God, we will defeat IS."</p>
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<p><i>Note: names have been changed to protect people's identities. Additional testimony obtained by Lydia Green.</i></p>
<p><i>IS territory data for maps: </i><a href="http://www.understandingwar.org/" class="story-body__link-external">Institute for the Study of War.</a></p>
<p><i>Video production and editing by Olivia Lang, Sunaina Gulati.</i></p>
<p><i>Web production by Lucy Rodgers. Maps by Mark Bryson, Tom Maslen, Nzar Tofiq.</i></p>
<p><i><a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32831854">http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32831854</a></i></p>
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ISIS reviving its 'Baghdad Belts' battle plan - Bill Roggio at FDD
tag:4freedoms.com,2014-07-04:3766518:Topic:152211
2014-07-04T01:33:26.875Z
Alan Lake
http://4freedoms.com/profile/AlanLake
<h3>Analysis: ISIS, Allies Reviving ‘Baghdad Belts’ Battle Plan</h3>
<div class="article_panel"><div class="image"><a href="http://www.defenddemocracy.org/images/sized/stuff/uploads/hotsheets/ISIS_Iraq_humvee_hs-260x190.jpg" target="_blank"><img class="align-right" src="http://www.defenddemocracy.org/images/sized/stuff/uploads/hotsheets/ISIS_Iraq_humvee_hs-260x190.jpg?width=260" width="260"></img></a></div>
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<p class="meta">Bill Roggio<br></br> 14th June 2014 - <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/06/analysis_isis_allies.php#">The Long War Journal</a></p>
<p>The lightning advance of the Islamic State…</p>
<h3>Analysis: ISIS, Allies Reviving ‘Baghdad Belts’ Battle Plan</h3>
<div class="article_panel"><div class="image"><a href="http://www.defenddemocracy.org/images/sized/stuff/uploads/hotsheets/ISIS_Iraq_humvee_hs-260x190.jpg" target="_blank"><img src="http://www.defenddemocracy.org/images/sized/stuff/uploads/hotsheets/ISIS_Iraq_humvee_hs-260x190.jpg?width=260" width="260" class="align-right"/></a></div>
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<p class="meta">Bill Roggio<br/> 14th June 2014 - <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/06/analysis_isis_allies.php#">The Long War Journal</a></p>
<p>The lightning advance of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham and its allies from Mosul to the outskirts of Samarra, as well as its capture of several towns in eastern Diyala, all over the course of several days, appears to be part of a greater strategy to surround the capital of Baghdad before laying siege to it. This plan, to take over the "belt" region outside of Baghdad and cut off the capital, appears to be the same strategy used by the ISIS' predecessor back in 2006.</p>
<p>The 2006 plan, which was drawn up by the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), the forerunner of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham (ISIS), was discovered after the US found a crude map on the body of Abu Musab al Zarqawi, al Qaeda in Iraq's leader who was killed by US forces in Baqubah in June 2006. The "Baghdad belts" map was released by Multinational Forces-Iraq during its offensive to liberate vast areas under al Qaeda/ISI control in 2007 and 2008.</p>
<p>Zarqawi's plan was to seize control of the outer provinces and Baghdad's belts, or key areas surrounding the capital. The ISI would then use its bases in the belts to control access to Baghdad and funnel money, weapons, car bombs, and fighters into the city. The ISI also planned to strangle the US helicopter air lanes by emplacing anti-aircraft cells along known routes in the belts areas around Baghdad.</p>
<div><p>In the ISI's 2006 plan, the Baghdad belts were divided into five regions: the "Southern Belt," which included northern Babil and southern Diyala provinces; the "Western belt," which included eastern Anbar province and the Thar Thar area; the "Northern belt," which included southern Salahaddin province and cities such as Taji; the "Diyala belt," which included Baqubah and Khalis; and the "Eastern belt," which included the rural areas east of Baghdad.</p>
<p>Watching the ISIS' operations today, it appears the group is attempting to implement a strategy which is very similar, if not identical, to the previous one. This should come as no surprise; Nasser al Din Allah Abu Suleiman, ISIS' current war minister, was a leader in al Qaeda in Iraq/ISI when the Baghdad belt strategy was implemented. Suleiman <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/05/al_qaeda_appoints_ne.php">was appointed by al Qaeda in May 2010</a> to serve as the terror group's top military commander after his predecessor, Abu Ayyub al Masri, <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/04/al_qaeda_in_iraqs_to.php">was killed</a> in a raid by Iraqi and US forces in April 2010.</p>
<p>US intelligence officials contacted by the <em>Long War Journal</em> who have extensive experience with al Qaeda in Iraq and the campaign to dislodge the group that began in 2007 said they believe the ISIS has dusted off its old plans to encircle Baghdad.</p>
<p><strong>ISIS marches to the Baghdad belt</strong></p>
<p>ISIS took the first step at the beginning of the year when it seized control of Fallujah and most of Anbar province. ISIS advanced to the outskirts of western Baghdad in March and April, when it captured Karma and Abu Ghraib.</p>
<p>After taking control of most of Anbar, ISIS launched a series of bombings and attacks in northern Babil province and southern Baghdad. The town of Jurf Al Sakhar is said to have fallen under ISIS control. The towns of Musayyib, Yusufiyah, Mahmoudiyah, Iskandariyah and Latifiyah in the so-called "triangle of death" area south of Baghdad have seen an uptick in attacks. These areas, which include a significant Sunni minority, sit along the fault line with Sunni and Shia, and were controlled by the ISI prior to the US surge in 2007.</p>
<p>ISIS' control of Anbar as well as eastern areas in neighboring Syria allowed it to set its sights on northern, central, and eastern Iraq. Over the past week ISIS forces, backed by allied groups such as Ansar al Islam, Jaish Muhammad, and even the Baathist-led Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order, seized control of Mosul and then swept southward, taking over Tikrit, Bayji, and several areas outside of Kirkuk before the southward advance was halted at Samarra.</p>
<p>ISIS forces also pressed into eastern Diyala province, capturing villages and towns in the Hamrin Mountains as well as Jalula and Saadiyah, and are threatening to move into Khalis and Baqubah.</p>
<p>As ISIS and allied forces moved southward, units also attacked along the highway between Samarra and Baghdad. The town of Dhuluiyah, just east of Balad, fell to ISIS units, while heavy fighting was reported in Taji, a city on the outskirts of Baghdad. Dhuluiyah was retaken by Iraqi forces on June 13.</p>
<p><strong>Dislodging ISIS will be a difficult task</strong></p>
<p>The ISIS advance toward Baghdad may be temporarily held off as the government rallies its remaining security forces and Shia militias organize for the upcoming battle. But at the least, ISIS should be able to take control of some Sunni neighborhoods in Baghdad and wreak havoc on the city with IEDs, ambushes, single suicide attacks, and suicide assaults that target civilians, the government, security forces, and foreign installations. Additionally, the brutal sectarian slaughter of Sunni and Shia alike that punctuated the violence in Baghdad from 2005 to 2007 is likely to return as Shia militias and ISIS fighters roam the streets.</p>
<p>Even if Iraqi forces are able to keep the ISIS from fully taking Baghdad and areas south, it is unlikely the beleaguered military and police forces will be able to retake the areas under ISIS control in the north and west without significant external support, as well as the support of the Kurds.</p>
<p>The ISIS and its allies are in a position today that closely resembles the ISI's position prior to the US surge back in early 2007. More than 130,000 US troops, partnered with the Sunni Awakening formations and Iraqi security forces numbering in the hundreds of thousands, were required to clear Anbar, Salahaddin, Diyala, Ninewa, Baghdad, and the "triangle of death." The concurrent operations took more than a year, and were supported by the US Air Force, US Army aviation brigades, and US special operations raids that targeted the ISI's command and control, training camps, and bases, as well as its IED and suicide bomb factories.</p>
<p>Today, the Iraqis have no US forces on the ground to support them, US air power is absent, the Awakening is scattered and in disarray, and the Iraqi military has been humiliated while surrendering or retreating during the jihadists' campaign from Mosul to the outskirts of Baghdad. The US government has indicated that it will not deploy US soldiers in Iraq, either on the ground or at airbases to conduct air operations.</p>
<p>ISIS is advancing boldly in the looming security vacuum left by the collapse of the Iraqi security forces and the West's refusal to recommit forces to stabilize Iraq. This has rendered the country vulnerable to further incursions by al Qaeda-linked jihadists as well as intervention by interested neighbors such as Iran. Overt Iranian intervention in Iraq would likely lead any Sunnis still loyal to the government to side with ISIS and its allies, and would ensure that Iraq would slide even closer to a full-blown civil war, and risk a wider war throughout the Middle East.<br/><br/></p>
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<p><em>Bill Roggio is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and editor of The Long War Journal.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/bill-roggio-analysis-isis-allies-reviving-baghdad-belts-battle-plan/">http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/bill-roggio-analysis-isis-allies-reviving-baghdad-belts-battle-plan/</a></p>
A good BBC documentary on the Iraq war
tag:4freedoms.com,2013-08-09:3766518:Topic:133204
2013-08-09T19:29:32.234Z
Alan Lake
http://4freedoms.com/profile/AlanLake
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Arab Fascists unite with German Nazis: from SS General "the Grand Mufti", to Saddam Hussein
tag:4freedoms.com,2013-03-02:3766518:Topic:119553
2013-03-02T22:52:06.119Z
Alan Lake
http://4freedoms.com/profile/AlanLake
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Al Qaeda graciously accepts apologies from US citizens
tag:4freedoms.com,2012-07-05:3766518:Topic:105985
2012-07-05T18:42:00.540Z
Alan Lake
http://4freedoms.com/profile/AlanLake
<p><a href="http://storage.ning.com/topology/rest/1.0/file/get/110489468?profile=original" target="_self"><img class="align-center" src="http://storage.ning.com/topology/rest/1.0/file/get/110489468?profile=original" width="337"></img></a></p>
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This was sent to me as coming from Iraq?
tag:4freedoms.com,2012-07-03:3766518:Topic:106012
2012-07-03T21:26:45.073Z
Alan Lake
http://4freedoms.com/profile/AlanLake
<p><a href="http://theync.com/static_html/al-furqan-media-executions_media.html" target="_blank">http://theync.com/static_html/al-furqan-media-executions_media.html</a></p>
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<p>Ignoring the shit site it is from can anyone translate the speech, text and symbols (flags etc.)?</p>
<p>If this is not Iraqi I would be interested to know where and who is involved.</p>
<p><a href="http://theync.com/static_html/al-furqan-media-executions_media.html" target="_blank">http://theync.com/static_html/al-furqan-media-executions_media.html</a></p>
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<p>Ignoring the shit site it is from can anyone translate the speech, text and symbols (flags etc.)?</p>
<p>If this is not Iraqi I would be interested to know where and who is involved.</p>
Beware the Brigades of Anger...
tag:4freedoms.com,2012-05-23:3766518:Topic:102729
2012-05-23T09:31:23.700Z
Alan Lake
http://4freedoms.com/profile/AlanLake
<p>I have read reports from different sources that at least 14 young people were stoned to death in Baghdad in the last month. <br></br> <br></br> This is being reported as a deliberate campaign by Shi'ite militants against kids who are dressed in 'emo' style. This subculture is widely perceived in Iraq as both gay and an expression of Satanism, say the reports.<br></br> <br></br> According to Reuters, militants in Shi'ite neighbourhoods where these kids were attacked, had circulated pamphlets on Saturday…</p>
<p>I have read reports from different sources that at least 14 young people were stoned to death in Baghdad in the last month. <br/> <br/> This is being reported as a deliberate campaign by Shi'ite militants against kids who are dressed in 'emo' style. This subculture is widely perceived in Iraq as both gay and an expression of Satanism, say the reports.<br/> <br/> According to Reuters, militants in Shi'ite neighbourhoods where these kids were attacked, had circulated pamphlets on Saturday morning naming at least 24 more youths who will be targeted for death if they do not change the way they dress.<br/> <br/> "We strongly warn you, to all the obscene males and females, if you will not leave this filthy work within four days the punishment of God will descend upon you at the hand of the Mujahideen," this pamphlet reads.<br/> <br/> Different reports are coming out about these attacks.<br/> <br/> The majority of the youths who have been attacked have died from severe skull fractures after being beaten with rocks and bricks, although I have also read they are using concrete blocks.<br/> <br/> Others, including two girls, were wounded in assaults, these were warnings…<br/> <br/> There are others being targeted and this is a part of a larger trend in the area, where as many as 58 Iraqis believed to be gay have been bludgeoned to death with rocks in the past six weeks.<br/> <br/> There were previous attacks in 2009 on those believed to be or known to be gay in Iraq. <br/> <br/> Iraq's leading Shi'ite clerics are half-heartedly condemning the attacks. Abdul-Raheem al-Rikabi, the representative for Iraq's most influential Shi'ite cleric, Ali al-Sistani, dismissed the killings as "terrorist attacks." I will be curious to see if any of these domestic terrorists are apprehended and held to account.<br/> <br/> Moqtada al-Sadr, a Shi'ite cleric who has described the emos as a "plague on Muslim society," has insisted that the youths be dealt with through the law. He has demanded that a community police force end the trend for good. <br/> <br/> So it appears that ending the trend for good means disposing of these kids who don’t ‘fit in’ to this society….<br/> <br/> It is important to note here that these killings have taken place since Iraq's interior ministry drew attention to the "emo" subculture last month by labelling it Satanism. <br/> <br/> The interior ministry has ordered the community police force to stamp it out. If this is the case, then are they calling their community police force terrorists?<br/> <br/> In response to the orders given to destroy this trend.. militants have issued leaflets with the names of emo kids who are in danger of being killed, or are these kill lists?<br/> <br/> Another leaflet in Sadr City bore 20 names and warned, "We are the Brigades of Anger. We warn you, if you do not get back to sanity and the right path, you will be killed," it said.<br/> <br/> So far reports say 14 youths have been brought to the hospital with fatal injuries from rocks and bricks, while 6 others were wounded as a ‘warning.’ <br/> <br/> Of course there is no official confirmation being supplied to the public that the deaths are indeed being linked to the victim's emo style. Hospital sources say they are "not authorized to speak to the media." Of course not, you might find yourself on a kill list next….<br/> <br/> The interior ministry denies any connection and have released statements condemning the media for allegations:<br/> <br/> Many media have reported fabricated news reports about the so-called ‘emo’ phenomenon — stories about tens of young people killed in various ways, including stoning. No murder case has been recorded with the interior ministry on so-called ‘emo’ grounds. All cases of murder recorded were for revenge, social and common criminal reasons.<br/> <br/> Of course they were…..<br/> <br/> Reports from Reuters say that 14 bodies were brought to three hospitals in eastern Baghdad. Security sources also have stated that six youth including two girls were wounded in beatings intended as warnings.<br/> <br/> 14 reported deaths but Hana al-Bayaty of Brussels Tribunal has said the current figure is much higher than that being reported to the public. They put the figures around 100 Iraqi teenagers being stoned or beaten to death for embracing Western Culture. (This was reported in an Arabic newspaper I March 2012)<br/> <br/> “At least 90 Iraqi teenagers with emo appearances have been stoned to death by religious extremists in Baghdad in the past month after an inflammatory interior ministry statement dubbed it ‘devil worshiping’, activists have said.”<br/> <br/> Iraq's Moral Police released a chilling statement on the interior ministry's website declaring its intent to "eliminate" the trend as soon as possible.” They have said it is detrimental to society and is regarded as a ‘danger’. Religious extremists reading these statements have been harassing and killing teenagers with ‘strange’ appearances.<br/> <br/> Armed men dressed as civilians have led dozens of teenagers to secluded areas where they are being stoned to death, their bodies then thrown into dumpsters. These men are said to belong to “one of the most extremist religious groups” in Iraq.<br/> <br/> One person who managed to escape told al-akbar that first they throw concrete blocks at the legs and arms of the kids, then a final blow to their face. If this doesn’t finish them, they will start over again.<br/> <br/> Another 26-year old man from Mosul said that unknown assailants killed two members of his heavy metal band on March 8. "<em>We don’t know who is behind this now, but for a long time, people have been accusing us of being Satanists. So this is not new, but now it has become murderous,</em>" he said.<br/> <br/> What is even more disturbing is that Iraq’s ‘moral’ police were granted approval by the Ministry of Education to enter schools in Baghdad and point out students who have emo-type appearances. This is according to a statement by the interior ministry. It has been indicated by human rights groups that there is complicity with the Ministry of Interior in the killings.<br/> <br/> Some young people have been arrested solely for wearing American jeans or having western haircuts.<br/> <br/> While the Ministry is warning extremists, "<em><strong>not to step on public freedom of Iraqis</strong></em>", they are talking out of the other side of their mouth by issuing statements such as the one below:<br/> <br/> The Director of the Moral Police of the Interior Ministry released a statement, saying <em>"The 'Emo phenomenon' or devil worshiping is being followed by the Moral Police who have the approval to eliminate [the phenomenon] as soon as possible since it's detrimentally affecting the society and becoming a danger."</em><br/> <br/> And this one:<br/> <br/> Colonel Mushtaq Taleb al-Mahemdawi said: "<em>The Emo Phenomenon was discovered a while back by members of our force in Baghdad. A report has been made and given to the Ministry of Interior to receive an approval to carry on with the investigation and to know how to eliminate the phenomenon."</em><br/> <br/> He added: "<em>The Ministry of Interior took this situation very seriously and received an approval from the Ministry of Education to set a plan under my full supervision and to allow us to enter schools in the capital."</em><br/> <br/> <em>"There are some cases of the spread of this phenomenon specifically among schools in Baghdad, but we are facing great difficulty in the lack of women on the force who would allow us to carry the investigation more accurately since the phenomenon is more popular among girls between the ages of 14 and 18."</em></p>
<p><em> I personally find this trend disturbing and am seeing reports of this type of activity or moral re-education of similar sub culture youth in other countries as well.. I welcome any comments, updates or clarification on this topic..</em><em> </em></p>
Iraq's Tribal "Sahwa": Its Rise and Fall - by Myriam Benraad
tag:4freedoms.com,2011-11-09:3766518:Topic:87620
2011-11-09T02:49:57.460Z
Alan Lake
http://4freedoms.com/profile/AlanLake
<div id="hd"><h1><a href="http://www.mepc.org/">Middle East Policy Council</a></h1>
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<div id="main"><h1>Iraq's Tribal "Sahwa": Its Rise and Fall - by <span style="font-size: 13px; font-weight: normal;">Myriam Benraad</span></h1>
<p><span style="font-size: 13px; font-weight: normal;"><br></br></span></p>
<div class="transcript"><p>From 2007 to 2008, Iraq's tribal "Sahwa" (Arabic for "Awakening") was a key component of the U.S. "surge" strategy and largely credited for its role in the dramatic…</p>
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<div id="hd"><h1><a href="http://www.mepc.org/">Middle East Policy Council</a></h1>
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<div id="main"><h1>Iraq's Tribal "Sahwa": Its Rise and Fall - by <span style="font-size: 13px; font-weight: normal;">Myriam Benraad</span></h1>
<p><span style="font-size: 13px; font-weight: normal;"><br/></span></p>
<div class="transcript"><p>From 2007 to 2008, Iraq's tribal "Sahwa" (Arabic for "Awakening") was a key component of the U.S. "surge" strategy and largely credited for its role in the dramatic reduction of violence across the country. In the last two years, though, members of the movement have increasingly become the target of a retaliation campaign led by al-Qaeda's "Islamic State of Iraq" and other insurgent groups still active on the battlefield, with almost daily assassinations and attacks in which hundreds have died. In the present context of resurgent violence, persistent political tensions triggered by the 2010 stalemate and the U.S. military's scheduled withdrawal of its remaining troops by the end of 2011, the Sahwa's future looms as one of the most crucial tests of Iraq's stabilization and successful "democratic" transition.<sup>2</sup> Concerns over the fate of the movement also come amid the growing alienation of its members from a government that has overall failed to incorporate them into its new security apparatus. While U.S. officials might continue to downplay this scenario, reliable sources indicate that a number of Sahwa fighters have already flipped back into armed struggle, including within the ranks of their erstwhile nemesis, al-Qaeda.<sup>3</sup></p>
<p>Building on my own extensive research, this article seeks to analyze a worrying trend and shed new light on the complex nature of the Sahwa since its appearance on the Iraqi scene. It first attempts to highlight the multiple reasons for the movement's gradual downfall, especially following the U.S. military drawdown in the summer of 2009, with specific focus on the motives likely to have incited some of its members to revert to al-Qaeda and other insurgent groups. The second part emphasizes aspects of continuity linking the Sahwa's recent evolution to the more historical transformations of Iraqi tribalism. It attempts to show, more particularly, how Iraq's tribal structures have undergone a continuing dynamic of "subversion" that actually preceded the establishment of Iraq's modern state. The last part underlines why U.S. policy makers should draw serious lessons from the movement's experiment, in particular why "tribal engagement" strategies in conflict configurations, even when bringing short-term security gains, should not be used at the expense of genuine state- and nation-building efforts.</p>
<h2>FROM SUCCESS TO DOWNFALL</h2>
<p>With hindsight, the Sahwa movement will undoubtedly be remembered as one of the most intriguing developments of the Iraqi conflict. Its emergence and rapid spread were indeed all the more remarkable in that it first came out of nothing and was initially limited to the uprising of a few tribal figures against al-Qaeda in the al-Anbar governorate — by then, the impregnable garrison of the insurgency. Yet, it should be borne in mind that the Sahwa originated and expanded in a very specific context — foreign occupation — and therefore always remained contingent on extremely volatile circumstances that, from the onset, should have warned of the probability of its members changing sides at some point in the course of the conflict.</p>
<p>The tribal mobilization took shape in late 2005, but was only formalized in September 2006 with the creation by tribes from Ramadi of an alliance — the "al-Anbar Salvation Council" (<em>Majlis inqadh al-Anbar</em>) — led by Abd al-Sattar al-Rishawi (commonly known as Abu Risha), a minor sheikh from the Dulaymi confederation. Since 2003, several Sunni Arab tribes from the governorate had been in latent conflict with al-Qaeda over the jihadist organization's extreme combat methods and killing campaign that had targeted hundreds of their leaders. These tribes also opposed the group's Salafist-inspired ambition to establish an Islamic "emirate" in their regions. However, their contacts with foreign forces had mostly remained residual, if existent at all. A first shift occurred in early 2005, when several sheikhs from the Albu Mahal tribe around the city of Qaim began to cooperate with U.S. troops in order to drive al-Qaeda out of their territory.<sup>4</sup> At the time, this shift also had much to do with the tribes' growing awareness of the benefits that such a rapprochement could mean for them in the longer run, especially in terms of political participation and power.</p>
<p>In the backdrop of the 2007 U.S. "surge," the Sahwa quickly took ground, with many tribal figures and imams rallying their ranks<sup>5</sup> and setting up other councils (<em>Majalis al-Sahwa</em>) in al-Anbar localities and beyond. The movement, moreover, enjoyed the additional mobilization all across the country of thousands of Sunni Arab fighters, mostly former insurgents — also referred to by the coalition as "Concerned Local Citizens" or "Sons of Iraq" (<em>Abna al-Iraq</em>). In less than a year, the Sahwa had become a major armed force comprising over 80,000 members.<sup>6</sup> Tribes were provided arms and significant financial resources to fight al-Qaeda and delegated important authority prerogatives in their areas to reestablish order. All in all, the impact of this tribal-engagement strategy proved quite spectacular, although largely unexpected. By mid-2007, insurgent hotbeds such as Ramadi and Fallujah had been cleansed and relatively pacified, to the surprise of the most skeptical.</p>
<p>A few years later, this picture has dramatically changed. The U.S. military drawdown from Iraqi cities in 2009, by providing al-Qaeda with new ground to operate — especially in al-Anbar, where security has kept deteriorating recently — has exposed the tribal movement to massive retaliatory attacks. These had started with the assassination in September 2007 of Abu Risha by the "Islamic State of Iraq," al-Qaeda's self-proclaimed government,<sup>7</sup> and have multiplied ever since. An equally worrying trend is that, faced with the jihadist group's brutal intimidations and threats, many Sahwa members are reported today to have returned to its ranks, either as operatives or accomplices.<sup>8</sup> Although no firm figures exist that precisely count how many have switched sides and rejoined al-Qaeda and other insurgent groups at this stage, recent official sources suggest that possibly thousands have done so since 2009, often while still on the government payroll and receiving ammunition.</p>
<h2>Economic Grievances</h2>
<p>Beyond the U.S. drawdown and its immediate consequences, this trend is also largely attributable to the growing economic grievances of the Sahwa. In this respect, one should not forget that the tribal movement originally emerged as a deeply "self-interested" phenomenon, a dimension that many U.S. decision makers and experts have long overlooked. Contrary to a somewhat naïve, yet often repeated, representation, the Sahwa never arose out of revived "tribal patriotism" against al-Qaeda. It began in 2005 over the al-Anbar tribes' loss of control over key resources, mainly reconstruction contracts and illicit revenues drawn from smuggling, robbery and black marketeering.<sup>9</sup> Once hospitable to al-Qaeda and its affiliates, the tribes had increasingly grown resentful of their violent interference and hijacking of local business. This was notably the case of the Albu Mahal, notorious for their smuggling activities on the Syrian border,<sup>10</sup> and Abu Risha himself, known for running a gang of bandits along the highway. Looking for immediate and effective ways to expel al-Qaeda from their territories and regain control of their illegal business and revenues, these tribes saw in their cooperation with U.S. forces a source of arms, training and alternative funding.</p>
<p>From the very beginning of its existence, the Sahwa was therefore intrinsically driven by the economic motives, not to say the overt opportunism, of its members. This dimension should have been a clear warning sign of the serious possibility of the movement's falling apart in time and the tribes' turning back to violence if their alliance of convenience with the United States ceased to bring sufficient benefits or to be satisfyingly rewarded.<sup>11</sup> This risk seemed all the higher, as the U.S. coalition had pledged to devote funds in support of the movement and provide Sahwa fighters with long-term employment by their progressive incorporation into Iraq's new security forces.</p>
<p>This promise was short-lived. Following their transfer to Iraqi authorities in early November 2008 — seen by many tribes as a "betrayal" by the United States — material privileges and the new authority enjoyed by Sahwa leaders slowly began to evaporate. In the summer of 2010, two years after Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had promised to integrate a quarter of the movement's forces, including former insurgents, into the state apparatus, less than half of them — approximately 42,000 of 94,000 — had been given security and public jobs, often temporary or seen as demeaning.<sup>12</sup> Promised salaries had either been meager, irregular or suppressed, with only very few Sahwa members effectively placed on the long-term government payroll. More recently, thousands of the movement's weapons permits have also been suspended in Diyala, one of Iraq's most violent governorates, in a clear attempt to disarm it once and for all.<sup>13</sup></p>
<p>These developments appear to have served al-Qaeda's objectives in the end. Reliable sources have reported that the organization currently exploits the Sahwa's grievances to approach and recruit many of its members, bribing them to carry out paid attacks or act as accomplices,<sup>14</sup> thereby gaining new ground in al-Anbar and other areas of Iraq. A "generational" dimension also seems at play: this dynamic is reported to be especially true of younger, unemployed and disenfranchised members of the movement, who are sometimes former al-Qaeda affiliates, have lost confidence in the future and are attracted by al-Qaeda's anti-system rhetoric, whereas most elder tribal leaders have regularly rejected al-Qaeda's recruitment calls.<sup>15</sup> Other Sahwa fighters also indicate that rejoining al-Qaeda or helping the group has been the best way to avoid becoming the victims of its assassinations, especially after they were banned by the government from carrying the weapons they considered necessary to protect themselves.</p>
<h2>Government Repression</h2>
<p>A second factor in the Sahwa's continued downfall is to be found in the profound hostility of Iraq's central government towards its members. From the start, Baghdad opposed the Sahwa, looking at its alliance with the United States with suspicion and resentment, concerned that its successes on the ground might translate into actual legitimacy and political power.<sup>16</sup> Although themselves divided, Shii and Kurdish political forces have also been uneasy with the movement and its sociological composition, fearing a resurgence of Sunni Arab influence in particular and opposing the formation of tribal councils in their own regions.<sup>17</sup> Sahwa leaders have nurtured a reciprocal mistrust and repeatedly accused al-Maliki's government of failing to restore public order and deliver basic services to the population, and of being a "puppet of Iran." However, the sectarian connotation of the Sahwa-government antagonism should not be overstated here. Indeed, the most virulent criticism of the movement has emanated from its own coreligionists: insurgent factions and, more particularly, Baghdad's Sunni Arab parliament bloc — the Iraq Accord Front (<em>al-Tawafuq</em>) — whose representatives have always feared that the movement would rise at their expense.<sup>18</sup></p>
<p>Since 2008 and the official transfer of the Sahwa's control to Iraqi authorities, relations between the tribes and Baghdad have continued to deteriorate. This explains the government's constant reluctance to integrate its members into state institutions, or at least to tolerate the tribes' security role in their own neighborhoods. Instead, Baghdad has conducted a systematic marginalization and elimination policy, exacerbated by mounting criticism of al-Maliki for having failed to restore security and implement effective national reconciliation.</p>
<p>In trying to disrupt the Sahwa, the prime minister used three strategic maneuvers. The first was, as mentioned, to deprive the movement of the material and financial means crucial to its survival. The second was more overt, consisting in repressing its members and systematically trying to disband tribal councils, as illustrated by the events in the Diyala governorate through 2008.<sup>19</sup> Sahwa members have been hunted, subjected to arrests and held on terrorism or illegal-weapons-possession charges. These crackdowns prompted vivid anger and a deep sense of humiliation among the movement's leaders, who repeatedly threatened to end their cooperation with the government, while al-Maliki justified this repression by pointing to the infiltration of the Sahwa by both al-Qaeda operatives and Baathists.<sup>20</sup> This argument has been recurrent in al-Maliki's rhetoric as a tool to discredit the Sahwa in the public eye, but one cannot deny Baghdad's quite legitimate fear that the movement might end up becoming a sort of third security force, an army outside the state, <em>de facto</em>leaving any future central state without control over significant parts of its territory.<sup>21</sup> Interestingly, as of 2007, the U.S. military had emphasized that such a danger would be avoided precisely through merging the Sahwa into the formal security apparatus.<sup>22</sup> The third strategy used by al-Maliki, less visible but far more pervasive, was finally to "divide and conquer" the Sahwa by setting up tribal structures parallel to existing ones and co-opting Sahwa leaders. The prime minister, for example, created in 2008 a "Tribal Support Council" in the Diyala governorate in an attempt to split the local movement by turning the Sahwa away from its grassroots and placing its members under Baghdad's patronage.<sup>23</sup></p>
<p>On the whole, this threefold strategy succeeded in depriving the Sahwa of resources that it critically needed in order to maintain itself and become a viable, long-term actor, especially within Iraq's political arena. Yet, al-Maliki's inflexible stance and unwillingness to fulfill the Sahwa's basic demands can also be considered a profound miscalculation. Combined with the political chaos brought about by the March 7, 2010, legislative elections, the government's anti-Sahwa attitude has obviously given space to the insurgency, more particularly al-Qaeda affiliates, to escalate their attacks on tribal mobilization and capitalize on the Sahwa's numerous socioeconomic and political frustrations to lure its members back into the armed struggle and radicalize their animosity towards the government. In several instances, Sahwa fighters have even expressed regret for having applied for public jobs.<sup>24</sup></p>
<h2>BETWEEN PAST AND PRESENT</h2>
<p>Beyond present circumstances, understanding of the Sahwa's progressive decline also requires placing the movement within the broader history of Iraqi tribalism and its many transformations, synonymous with a continued process of "subversion"<sup>25</sup>of tribal norms and structures.</p>
<h2>Diversity and Factionalism</h2>
<p>In many regards, the case of the Sahwa has reignited the debate over the place of tribalism within Iraqi society, if not within Arab and Muslim societies at large. In that respect, while tribal identity might still play an important role in Iraq, even in the case of urbanized populations, analysis continues to be distorted by an "essentialist" bias and representations that have long plagued research on Arab tribes. As French anthropologist Pierre Bonte rightly put it, "the tribalization of Arab societies, by eliminating any consideration of other aspects of their culture, undoubtedly contributed to the marginalization, until recently, of the anthropological research they have inspired."<sup>26</sup> Consequently, studies of Iraqi tribalism have often been limited by simplistic assumptions, in particular, that it is a homogenous and static phenomenon.</p>
<p>It is important to recall here that tribalism in Iraq has never been a unified reality but, on the contrary, extremely porous and variable. It has been marked by complex geographic disparities, social structures and relations among its members. Schematically, Iraqi tribes and tribal confederations have divided themselves into clans, lineages, houses and families sharing a common ancestry — real or imagined — as well as kinship ties.<sup>27</sup> Iraqi tribes can vary greatly around interactions and distinctions between individuals that can often appear confusing to the outside observer. A tribe from al-Anbar has, for instance, little to do with a tribe from the south or even with a tribe from another locality in its own governorate. Iraqi tribalism has, moreover, always been characterized by intense endogenous rivalries and factionalism, which have only tended to increase as traditional solidarities, supposed to bind the members of a tribe, have endured profound changes over time. Today, one might even wonder whether Iraq can still be described as a "tribal" society in the classical sense of the word.</p>
<p>The breakdown of traditional kinship ties began during the Ottoman Empire with the introduction, in 1858, of the first land code, which sedentarized Iraqi tribes. While the sheikhs remained influential under the British Mandate, this dynamic continued with the country's modernization and the attendant rural exodus and urbanization.<sup>28</sup> Agrarian reforms passed in the 1950s further transformed Iraq's tribalism. In particular, the expropriation and redistribution of land put an end to the privileges that landlords had long enjoyed and removed ties of subordination of the peasants — usually smaller tribes — to their patrons. The Baathist regime exacerbated this process by adopting a series of policies that further contributed to deconstructing Iraq's tribal fabric.<sup>29</sup></p>
<p>In many ways, such deconstruction has been reflected in the Sahwa's own organization and evolution. While the movement may have begun as a common mobilization against al-Qaeda, thus demonstrating apparent solidarity among its leaders, it has never been a unified reality. The social structures and the functioning of the tribal councils established in governorates like Salahaddin, Diyala, Babil and Tamim, or in al-Anbar itself, have significantly differed from each other, as has the identity of their members. At first kept under wraps, the rivalries among Sahwa leaders became more and more overt as the movement became increasingly politicized. For some time, the greatest enemy of the movement was even thought likely to come from within, especially after the assassination of Abu Risha and the leadership battles that it prompted. His brother Ahmad, first considered the legitimate successor, was indeed opposed by figures such as Ali Hatim al-Sulayman, a prominent sheikh from the al-Dulaymi confederation, or Hamid Farhan al-Hayis, both regarding themselves as the Sahwa's genuine heirs, but whose feuds only led to multiple political factions without any true popularity.<sup>30</sup></p>
<p>This explains why the Sahwa, since it first emerged, has been structurally unable to define a long-term political project for Iraq. Several Sahwa figures participated in the provincial elections of January 2009 and garnered relatively good results, especially in al-Anbar. However, this did not last. Their mobilization split along a wide range of parties that eventually had to ally themselves with broader electoral coalitions to run for office. Other forces, such as the Iraqi Islamic party in al-Anbar,<sup>31</sup> also largely exploited intertribal divides as part of their political calculations. The March 2010 elections, dominated by al-Maliki's "State of Law" and Iyad Allawi's "Iraqiy-yah" lists, have confirmed the movement's need to merge into strong nationally based alliances to ensure a degree of survival.</p>
<h2>Opportunism, Shifting Loyalties</h2>
<p>Another aspect of the subversion of Iraqi tribalism has been the growing opportunism and shifting loyalties of the tribes over time, largely echoed today by the Sahwa and profoundly emblematic of the country's early history.</p>
<p>As of the 1920s, King Faysal, concerned not to alienate the tribes, provided them with key administrative prerogatives (land-tax collection, recruitment of military and police personnel) that made them intermediaries between Baghdad and the rural periphery. This patron-client pattern continued into the republican era and then became systemic under Saddam Hussein, who, after trying to eradicate tribalism from society, launched a "retribalization"<sup>32</sup> (or "state tribalism"<sup>33</sup>) strategy in the late 1980s as a regime-perpetuation tool. Baghdad widened the circle of submissive tribes, which benefited from the material and financial largess of the regime (arms, lands, food rations) and important local security and administrative powers, as well as state tolerance for their illegal activities (smuggling). In 1991, when the Shii south was engulfed in a rebellion that the regular army failed to put down, it was to the tribes that Saddam turned.<sup>34</sup> This privileged position, however, remained primarily instrumental, though it has been wrongly interpreted as a reaffirmation of tribal authority. In fact, tribes were mostly obedient, tied to the regime by a formal oath of allegiance that tolerated no form of opposition.<sup>35</sup> As emphasized by Amatzia Baram, "Rather than eliminating the tribal shaykh as a sociopolitical power, as dictated by party doctrine, [Saddam Hussein] endeavored to manipulate the shaykhs and, through a process of socialization (or 'Baathization'), turn them into docile tools in the service of the regime."<sup>36</sup></p>
<p>Similarly, the Sahwa since 2006 has often been depicted by its detractors as a force both "bought" and manipulated by the United States, a new "symptom" of the opportunism and changing allegiances of Iraqi tribes, which now would not hesitate to revert to al-Qaeda in spite of bribes and other payments. It is worth noting, in this respect, that concerns about this dual feature arose early on. Fears on the Iraqi side were all the more serious, as many of the Sahwa fighters had been former insurgents who had often fought foreign troops among the ranks of al-Qaeda. Ever since, the popular perception of the Sahwa as a group of mere opportunists whose loyalty can be bought by the highest bidder has been one of the key factors discrediting the group. Many Iraqis have, from the beginning, expressed distrust for the real motives behind the tribes' decision to help U.S. forces, often calling them "thugs," "bandits" and "mercenaries," or "tribes of the 2000s" — in reference to the label that was used during the Saddam Hussein years, "tribes of the 1990s."</p>
<h2>STATE BUILDING AND RECONCILIATION</h2>
<p>The Sahwa is thus far from embodying the resurrection of noble tribal values in Iraq, as the movement was sometimes described. On the contrary, the tribe's mobilization has been, and remains, a deeply unpredictable actor, hardly compatible with state- and nation-building efforts.</p>
<p>Back in 2003, many Iraqi tribes saw in the fall of Saddam Hussein the historical opportunity to rebuild their once lost authority. As it happened, the Sahwa's ascension and success were interpreted as an actual reorganization of tribal power after decades of marginalization by the central state. Some even argued that the tribes would become the cornerstone of the Iraqi state's rebuilding and a catalyst of the county's democratization.<sup>37</sup> To date, the movement, which seemed so promising, has yet to become institutionalized. Baghdad steadily refuses to transition its members into the new state.</p>
<p>Internal conflicts within the Sahwa and the highly unstable allegiances of its leaders are certainly not factors that favor such a role. Besides, the tribes have a long history of conflict with central authorities and still consider that the Iraqi state was built and expanded at their expense. With few exceptions so far, and although Saddam Hussein's regime was itself profoundly clannish in nature, the tribes never really managed to acquire a political role on Iraq's national scene. Marked by its own rules and structures, tribalism is in fact hard to meld into a modern, centralized state based on the rule of law. Tribal hierarchies and shifting loyalties, by dangerously overlapping with the formal governance apparatus, can constitute a threat to both central and federal levels of power and to long-term state consolidation.</p>
<p>Moreover, tribes' own justice forums and reconciliation procedures make tribalism difficult to harmonize with the formal national reconciliation dynamic, although Sahwa leaders have regularly declared that they stood for "national unity." In light of the movement's current decay and the way it has contributed to even greater fragmentation of Iraq's sociopolitical landscape, it is hard to foresee how the Sahwa could turn into a pillar of national reconciliation, whether now or later. Instead of favoring a national dialogue, the movement has rather appeared as a socially and politically atomizing force that has reinforced lines of division, when not creating new ones.</p>
<p>These dividing lines go well beyond the sectarian split that is often put forward by Western media, opposing the "Sunni" Sahwa to a "Shii" government. They are also profoundly socioeconomic, structured around the revival, for instance, of the old historical opposition between Baghdad and outside areas, encompassing both a geographic and a social cleavage between urbanized elites and a peripheral rural world populated by tribes and commonly perceived as poor and backward.<sup>38</sup> Interestingly, this "class" divide has also been present within the localities themselves where the Sahwa has spread, opposing local notables to the sheikhs.</p>
<p>Socioeconomic divides have also manifested themselves through the opposition between two groups: the tribal elders who fled Iraq in 2003 due to their dealings with the former regime but still consider themselves the true heads of their clans and tribes, and younger sheikhs who have mainly used the Sahwa and their alliance with the United States as a means to bypass the old hierarchies, enrich themselves, constitute new patronage networks, bolster their authority and gain political power.</p>
<h2>CONCLUSION</h2>
<p>As the United States prepares to pull out of Iraq, the Sahwa's future promises to be one of the most difficult challenges facing the new Iraqi government, formed after months of political vacuum through a recent controversial power-sharing agreement. While it is undeniable that in 2006 the movement substantially contributed to reducing violence after Iraq's worst bloodshed, it has remained a circumstantial and fragile phenomenon, as highlighted in this article. Once praised as a cornerstone of Iraq's stabilization process, the Sahwa now threatens to backfire and become a major source of instability because of its opposition to the government — and the fact that many of its fighters are said to have returned to al-Qaeda and related groups.</p>
<p>Attempts to demobilize the movement, even smoothly, have proven troublesome, and the will of al-Maliki to disarm and disband it could lead to even greater levels of violence and possibly a return to large-scale conflict. Indeed, casting off Sahwa fighters when they still play a security role in their regions and neighborhoods and have not yet completely cut ties with the government can only make them easier recruits for the insurgency. Of course, it is also true that absorbing them into the security and state apparatus when the situation is still so uncertain and no national reconciliation has taken place can be a recipe for disaster.</p>
<p>Ultimately, a compromise will have to be found and could well replicate Saddam's old patronage strategy: "clientelizing" the Sahwa by bestowing on its members enough prerogatives, even informal ones, to meet their major demands, frame their loyalty and prevent their reversion to violence. The counterpart of such a strategy would mean greater autonomy for the tribes in their areas and therefore a relative, although implicitly approved, loss of control by Baghdad over parts of the national territory.</p>
<p>As for the United States, although it now has limited influence on internal Iraqi politics, except primarily through diplomacy, it should draw the appropriate lessons from the Sahwa experiment, especially as they relate to tribal engagement on other conflict fronts, Afghanistan and Pakistan in particular. Local warlords previously allied with foreign forces have, as in Iraq, shown a propensity to shift back to the armed struggle. This, once again, should highlight the fact that a long-term counterinsurgency strategy cannot be reduced to short-term security gains, but also requires sustained efforts toward state- and nation-building.</p>
<div class="footnote"><p><sup>*</sup> Most of the following developments are drawn from research and observations on the Sahwa previously published by the author in the French anthropology journal <em>Études rurales</em>: "Une lecture critique de la Sahwa ou les mille et un visages du tribalisme irakien," No. 184, July-December 2009, pp. 95-106.</p>
<p><sup>2</sup> See, for example, Shashank Bengali, "With U.S. Presence Fading in Iraq, Ex-militia Faces Uncertain Future," <em>McClatchy Newspapers</em>, December 6, 2010.</p>
<p><sup>3</sup> In January 2011, a Sahwa leader said to be involved in three car bombings in Karbala against Shii pilgrims was arrested by Iraqi police forces. He was said to be working for the Islamic Army and having "one foot in terrorism, and one foot in the state." See Qassim Abdul-Zahra, "Iraq Militia Chief was behind Pilgrim Blasts," Associated Press, January 22, 2011; and "Iraq Nabs Sunni Militiamen over Karbala Attack," Agence France Presse, January 21, 2011.</p>
<p><sup>4</sup> See Ellen Nickmeyer and Jonathan Finer, "Insurgents Assert Control over Town near Syrian Border," <em>The Washington Post</em>, September 6, 2005.</p>
<p><sup>5</sup> See Sam Dagher, "Sunni Muslim Sheikhs Join U.S. in Fighting Al-Qaeda," <em>Christian Science Monitor</em>, May 3, 2007.</p>
<p><sup>6</sup> See Maggie O'Kane and Ian Black, "Sunni Militia Strike Could Derail U.S. Strategy against al-Qaida," <em>The Guardian</em>, March 21, 2008.</p>
<p><sup>7</sup> For details on the Islamic State of Iraq's current ideological narrative, see Myriam Benraad, "Down But Not Out," ForeignPolicy.com, December 2, 2009.</p>
<p><sup>8</sup> See Hamza Hendawi, "Al-Qaida in Iraq Offers Cash to Lure Former Allies," Associated Press, August 6, 2010.</p>
<p><sup>9</sup> On this aspect, see Alissa J. Rubin and Damien Cave, "In a Force for Iraqi Calm, Seeds of Conflict,"<em> The New York Times</em>, December 23, 2007.</p>
<p><sup>10</sup> See Alexandra Zavis, "Iraq Militants Seen As Taking Kickbacks," <em>The Los Angeles Times</em>, October 26, 2007.</p>
<p><sup>11</sup> Among the first sources critical of the tribal engagement strategy in Iraq were Leila Fadel, "Iraqi Tribal, U.S. Relations Could Spell Success or Disaster," <em>McClatchy Newspapers</em>, June 13, 2007; U.S. Buys 'Concerned Citizens' in Iraq, But at What Price? Agence France Presse, October 16, 2007; Yochi Dreazen and Gina Chon, "Will the Security Improvements in Iraq Endure?" <em>The Wall Street Journal</em>, December 3, 2007; and Katharina Goetze, Daud Salman and Zaineb Naji, "Could Awakening Fighters Rejoin Insurgency?" <em>ICR</em>, No. 274, October 31, 2008. See also the excellent analysis of counter-insurgency expert David Kilcullen, "Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt," <em>Small Wars Journal</em>, August 29, 2007.</p>
<p><sup>12</sup> See Leila Fadel, "Former Iraqi Insurgent Contemplates Returning to War," <em>McClatchy Newspapers</em>, May 24, 2009.</p>
<p><sup>13</sup> See "Iraq Disarms Sunni Tribal Militias, Defence Ministry Refuses to Renew Weapons Permits for Members of Awakening Councils," Agence France Presse, June 6, 2010.</p>
<p><sup>14</sup> Several Sahwa members have reported that al-Qaeda usually offers to increase by $100 or more the salary of a fighter — usually ranging between $250 and $300 — if they accept to join the jihadist organization. See Hamza Hendawi, op. cit.</p>
<p><sup>15</sup> See Timothy Williams and Duraid Adnan, "Sunnis in Iraq Allied with U.S. Rejoin Rebels," <em>The New York Times</em>, October 16, 2010; and Mohammed al-Qaisi, "Al-Sahwa Forces in Iraq Reject al-Qaeda's Recruitment Call," Al-Shorfa.com, August 10, 2010.</p>
<p><sup>16</sup> See Trudy Rubin, "Powerful Awakening Shakes Iraqi Politics," <em>Philadelphia Inquirer</em>, December 12, 2007.</p>
<p><sup>17</sup> The Sahwa mostly failed to filter into southern Shii provinces due to Baghdad's animosity towards the movement, while the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) opposed the formation of tribal councils in areas subject to Article 140 of the present Constitution, which calls for a reversal of the Baathist "Arabization" in Kirkuk and parts of the Ninawa governorate.</p>
<p><sup>18</sup> See Brian Katulis, Peter Juul and Ian Moss, "Awakening to New Dangers in Iraq: Sunni 'Allies' Pose an Emerging Threat," Center for American Progress, February 2008, pp. 7-8.</p>
<p><sup>19</sup> See Ahmed Ali and Dahr Jamail, "Tensions Rise between 'Awakening' and Iraqi Govt Forces," Inter Press Service, March 1, 2008.</p>
<p><sup>20</sup> See "PM Says Saddam Loyalists Infiltrated Iraq's Sahwa Militia," Agence France Presse, April 3, 2009; "Al-Qaeda Infiltrating Sahwa Fighters in Iraq," <em>Time</em>, April 2, 2009; and "Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq," <em>Report to Congress</em>, March 7, 2008.</p>
<p><sup>21</sup> Thereby replicating a configuration that had prevailed under the embargo with, on the one hand, a weak and sanctuarized central state — named in the 1990s the "Republic of the Greater Baghdad" — and, on the other hand, tribes maintaining order at the country's peripheries. See Françoise Rigaud, "Irak: le temps suspendu de l'embargo," <em>Critique internationale</em>, No. 11, April 2001, pp. 18-20.</p>
<p><sup>22</sup> See the declaration of U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker: "We always felt that [Sahwa members] have to link up to the government of Iraq (…) That has got to happen or nothing good is coming down the line," in Hoda Jasim and Rahma al Salem, "The Awakening Council: Iraq's Anti-al-Qaeda Sunni Militias," <em>al-Sharq al-Awsat</em>, December 29, 2007.</p>
<p><sup>23</sup> See Alissa J. Rubin, "Clash over Tribal Councils Intensifies in Iraq," <em>The New York Times</em>, November 4, 2008.</p>
<p><sup>24</sup> See Jonathan Steele, "Iraq: Arrests of Sunni Tribal Leaders Risk Giving al-Qaida a Way Back, Says Iraqi Vice-President,"<em>The Guardian</em>, September 16, 2008; and Salah Hemeid, "What Future for the Sahwas?" <em>al-Ahram Weekly</em>, No. 1002, June 10-16, 2010.</p>
<p><sup>25</sup> "Subversion" derives from the Latin word <em>subvertere</em>, which literally means "to overturn." The term generally connotes the idea of disrupting, corrupting or causing the downfall of a given social and political order. It also refers to the action of undermining or destroying an individual or a group's loyalty and moral integrity.</p>
<p><sup>26</sup> See Pierre Bonte, <em>Al-Ansâb. La quête des origines. Anthropologie historique de la société tribale arabe</em> (Paris: Éditions de la MSH, 1991), p. 14 [translation by the author].</p>
<p><sup>27</sup> For an anthropological description of Iraqi tribal structures, see Hosham Dawod and Faleh Jabar, eds., <em>Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East </em>(London: Saqi Books, 2003). For French and Arabic sources, see Hosham Dawod, "Société et pouvoirs en Irak : une approche anthropologique," in Hosham Dawod and Hamit Bozarslan, eds., <em>La société irakienne. Communautés, pouvoir et violence</em> (Paris : Karthala/IISMM, 2003), pp. 5-30; and Abbas al-Azzawi, <em>'Ashâ'ir al-'Irâq</em> (Baghdad Press, 1937).</p>
<p><sup>28</sup> Prominent Iraq historian Hanna Batatu described this dynamic using a "social class" conflict approach, and opposed impoverished "peasants" — minor tribes — to wealthy "landlords" — elder sheikhs from greater tribes. See "The Shaikh and the Peasant in Iraq, 1919-1958," doctoral thesis (Harvard University, 1960); and <em>The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq</em> (Princeton University Press, 1978).</p>
<p><sup>29</sup> For an exhaustive account of these tribal policies, see Amatzia Baram, "Neo-Tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein's Tribal Policies 1991-96," <em>International Journal of Middle East Studies</em>, Vol. 29, No. 1, February 1997, p. 3.</p>
<p><sup>30</sup> See Fadhil Ali, "Sunni Rivalries in al-Anbar Province Threaten Iraq's Security," <em>Terrorism Focus</em>, Jamestown Foundation, November 3, 2008.</p>
<p><sup>31</sup> See Nirmeen Hamid, "Anbar's Islamic Party and Tribes Vie for Power," <em>Niqash</em>, December 12, 2008.</p>
<p><sup>32</sup> See Amatzia Baram, op. cit., pp. 10-18.</p>
<p><sup>33</sup> See Hosham Dawod, "The Stateization of the Tribe and the Tribalization of the State: The Case of Iraq," in Faleh Jabar and Hosham Dawod, eds., op. cit.</p>
<p><sup>34</sup> Amatzia Baram, op. cit., pp. 7-10.</p>
<p><sup>35</sup> Several tribal uprisings were therefore repressed during that period, such as these fomented by Dulaymi clans from Ramadi. See Helga Graham, "Saddam's Circles of Hatred," <em>The Independent</em>, August 20, 1995.</p>
<p><sup>36</sup> Amatzia Baram, op. cit., p. 1.</p>
<p><sup>37</sup> The idea has been suggested by David Kilcullen, op. cit.: "In the Iraqi polity, tribes' rights may end up playing a similar role to states' rights in some other democracies."</p>
<p><sup>38</sup> See Jack Fairweather, "Political Ambitions of Sunni Tribal Leader Worry Baghdad Elite," <em>Financial Times</em>, April 19, 2008.</p>
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