The 4 Freedoms Library

It takes a nation to protect the nation

Last week, Islamist extremists were found guilty of plotting a terrorist attack on a rally of the English Defence League. The case shows how extremists from both sides are turning to violent means. It also shows how Jihadists in the United Kingdom are focusing on domestic targets.

The plan was to attack an English Defence League (EDL) march in Dewsbury and possibly leader Tommy Robinson using knives, machetes, shotguns and explosives. A number of the figures in the plot had appeared on the periphery of other investigations: at least one was already on bail (having served time) for possession of terrorist material, another was a fundraiser in a separate plot to carry out an unspecified suicide bombing and another was the brother of a plotter from the same investigation. The case highlights a number of issues for British security, intelligence agencies and the police. This includes  understanding the multiple strands of  potential terrorist activity in the Birmingham'network of networks'; understanding the dynamic between Islamist extremists and the Far right and living with the embedded domesticization of the terrorist threat in the United Kingdom.

The Plot

The particular plot to target the EDLwas one that was part of a phenomenon of growing concern to security officials. The plotters actions seem to be part of an apparent escalation that the two sides share in the press and at events: the group of Islamist extremists from Birmingham were planning to drive north and launch an attack against a planned EDL march in Dewsbury on 30 June 2012. They had gathered knives, machetes, sawn-off shotguns, a partially constructed pipe bomb, a fireworks based improvised explosive device and had in their possession a letter addressed to Prime Minister David Cameron, the Queen and the 'English Drunkards League.' The men had allegedly aborted their attack after being late for the EDL rally, returning home having done nothing. Had they been able to carry out their attack, the casualties could have been high and police were unable to rule out that the group had been planning a suicide attack.

This is the first plot in which a group of Islamist terrorists has chosen to take measures to directly target members of the EDL, an extremist group that 'was founded in the wake of the shocking actions of a small group of Muslim extremists who, at a homecoming parade in Luton, openly mocked the sacrifices of our service personnel without any fear of censure.' The parade in question was in March 2009 and was conducted by a group that was praised by self-appointed preacher AnjemChoudhry - one of the leading figures in the now-banned al Muhajiroun - and involved a number of individuals who had been affiliated with the group in Luton. Similarly inflammatory incidents have been carried out on Remembrance Days in 2010 (during which a protester burned a symbolic poppy) and 2011 (when the protest used the headline 'Hell for Heroes'), and a planned protest at Wootton Basset in 2010 was cancelled after much publicity. 

The EDL'sresponse to this has been a series of protest marches up and down the country, all of which attract varying degrees of support and attention. The group has not been linked to any terrorist plots, though a number of its members have been arrested over time for various public order offences - usually involving violence at protests. Separately there have also been arrests of far right activists allegedly planning bombings of some kind, though their group affiliation (if any) remains unclear.

The picture from a government perspective is a negative one. An already polarised public political conversation is taking a more violent tone. The danger of a cyclical reaction and counter-reaction between the two sides of an extreme equation seems increasingly tangible, with already heightened tensions between different communities now finding acts of terrorism palatable. The question becomes whether this particular event will spark a possible counter-reaction or simply prove a one off.

Local Targeting, Less Command and Control

From a solely violent Islamist perspective, this plot highlights both the ongoingand embedded nature of the domestic threat, and the growing evidence of a lack of command and control from overseas. Whilst individuals in this plot were involved in a separate cell, there is little in the public domain to suggestthat they received instruction from Al-Qa'ida. Rather, the plot seems to have been one that was concocted amongst networks based in the United Kingdom, loosely using publications like Inspire magazine as guides to build devices, but targeted at domestic, almost 'local' grievance issues. The choice of the EDL as a target is not actually that new: in a recent case in Luton the group mentioned the EDL on a list of potential targets that included the Security Service, MI5, and the US Air Force (USAF). In a separate case, radicalised convert Richard Dart mentioned attacking a protest at Wootton Basset as a possible target while also being in possession of a recording of himself delivering a video 'Message to the EDL' on a 'Muslims Against Crusades' video. But in neither of these cases had individuals done more than include the group as one of a number of possible targets they were interested in exploring within the UK.

This choice of targeting reflects a growing trend in British violent Islamist networks where they have chosen targets of a very domestic British nature rather than international.  Is it the case that much like politics, all terrorism is local?  Rather than public transport, international targets or large shopping arenas, this group intended to target a domestic British political organisation. Similar efforts in the past include the attempt in September 2008 to firebomb the home of the publisher of the book The Jewel of Medina, a book that had attracted some controversy for its portrayal of the Prophet Muhammed or Roshonara Choudhry's attempted murder of MP Stephen Timms for his vote in favour of the Iraq War after she had watched a series of videos by Anwar al Awlaki. In both of these cases, the ideology that was underpinning the choice of targets was support for a global jihadist cause, but the end result was a choice of target that was more a reflection of local concerns that international targeting. This reflects, at least in part, the fact that none of these cells had any clear connections to outside plotters who might have steered them towards more prominent targets with an international profile.

A Complex Intelligence Picture

The product of this approach is a set of plots that demonstrate less external direction and more haphazard targeting. This complicates traditional threat assessments of targeting choices, as well as making harder the job of identifying cells pre-emptively. Traditionally, security and intelligence services and police find cells or plotters through their communication or contacts with others: if a cell lacks any direct command and control from abroad or is a Lone Actor, then this becomes a harder proposition. This also means that it is harder to identify and assess individuals within a broad community of interest who are either involved or on the periphery of a terrorist cell.

If individuals are all radicalising within a broader community and the targeting decisions are coming around in a more random manner - using easily accessible weapons and focused on domestic political targets - officials observing may find it difficult to distinguish which are moving towards a terrorist atrocity versus those who are simply expressing extreme political views. Additionally, when the targeting picture is one focused on domestic British extremist political entities, it means that a potentially much wider group of people are affected: there are many individuals who talk loudly about being angry about the EDL or other similar groups, but which are those who are talking with potentially terrorist intent versus those simply expressing anger and opposition? A Sheffield man was charged with threatening the EDL with an attack after he sent a threatening message through their website: a jury was unable to reach a conclusion in a case where the defendant claimed to have sent the message out of personal spite with no intent.

Finally, it is worth noting that this cell targeting the EDL was one that was actively part of the extremistcommunity in Birmingham that has been the source of a number of serious terrorism cases of late. Jewel Uddin, one of the key figures in the group targeting the EDL was a fundraiser for a cell convicted recently for planning to carry out an unspecified suicide bombing in the United Kingdom. Uddin was in fact mentioned during the previous trial as an individual who appeared on a number of wiretaps and was at least briefly under direct intelligence surveillance:whilehe purchased knives that were subsequently discovered in a vehicle with other weapons the cell was going to use in attacking the EDL march.

Another member of the group, Zohaib Kamran Ahmad was previously incarcerated on charges of possessing radical material, while AnzalHussain was the brother of one of the individuals involved in the previous Birmingham case. This means that in total 17 Birmingham men have pled guilty of terrorism offences in quick succession, highlighting ongoing radicalisation within the city. Locals point to the fact that families in Birmingham tried to resolve some of the issues themselves rather than alert authorities as a good sign about trends in recognizing and accepting the danger of radicalisation in the city. Nevertheless, it is becoming apparent that Birmingham isa rising as a source of concern for British security authorities.

Overall, there is a complicated domestic picture that is matched by an equally confused map abroad where Al-Qa'ida's increased fracturing offers numerous new regions where potential threats might brew - like parts of the Sahel, Nigeria, Syria and so on. The terrorist threat in the UK may seem increasingly amateurish and domestic, but it maintains the potential to produce sudden, sharp blows. Understanding where these may come and how they express themselves will continue to be a concern for the next few years.

Tags: RUSI

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Replies to This Discussion

Until the 'experts' are prepared to consider the political ideology that motivates terrorist actions, and target the books and leaders of that ideology, they will always be re-active and post-hoc.  Till then, we may as well all go back to sleep and just hope that we aren't in a carriage that gets blown up.

The experts describe the EDL as an ‘extremist group’.  The experts describe the Islamist as ‘extremists’.  And both are on ‘two sides of an extreme equation’. 

So are they extreme in different ways or in the same way?  

Are the experts supposed to help us understand this threat?

Yes it is ‘complex’ and ‘complicated’.  What might focus their collective minds would be if these experts went to every EDL march until they do figure things out; instead of observing from the sidelines and their keyboards.

Considering the number of newspaper articles, TV programmes, university departments, academic experts, muslim groups, bloggers, activists... expressing opinions about EDL, you would think that some of them at the very least detailed the policy statements of EDL and compared and contrasted them with Hizb ut Tahrir, MPAC, SWP, Respect, BNP, LibDems, Islam4UK, etc, and actually informed the public about the details of why some of these groups are considered "extreme" and others are considered "moderate".

But all that money, and all those words, are actually not about information.  They are about noise and thought control.

Kinana said:

The experts describe the EDL as an ‘extremist group’.  The experts describe the Islamist as ‘extremists’.  And both are on ‘two sides of an extreme equation’. 

So are they extreme in different ways or in the same way?  

Are the experts supposed to help us understand this threat?

Yes it is ‘complex’ and ‘complicated’.  What might focus their collective minds would be if these experts went to every EDL march until they do figure things out; instead of observing from the sidelines and their keyboards.

So, a couple of months ago some retired General, now some kind of Prof. at RUSI, said that even a 2nd year student at a military academy could devise a strategy to destroy ISIS/the Caliphate.

Yet here we are 2 months later, and the media are admitting that the air strikes against the devout muslims are having absolutely no effect.

It seems that every single time an expert from RUSI opens his mouth he puts his foot in it. Yet as Thomas Sowell points out, the Anointed are never held to account when their predictions prove to be 100% wrong.

Intelligence analysts in the US are claiming that their pessimistic reports about the ability to contain IS are being re-written to conform with Obama's claim that his initiatives are winning.

Here's more:

So, Blain has his "sexed up" dossier which justifies war in Iraq. Later Blair says he knew nothing of islam when in office.  Organisations like RUSI laugh at IS and tell The Demos: don't take it seriously. The Muslim PoTUS has intelligence repots rewritten. Clinton hangs out Ambassador & soldiers to be killed in Benghazi.

And still the Anointed, the Elite, carry on unscathed.

Publisher’’s Preface
Dear Reader:
We are pleased to offer this electronic
version of General S.K. Malik’’s book,
Quranic Concept of War
, to the public. We are making this volume available because
of its critical significance in the ideo
logical foundations of the international
movement and the unapologetic rationale
if offers for the use of terrorism to
accomplish political and religious ends. Not only does Malik’’s book take a
prominent place amongst contemporary interp
retations of the Islamic doctrine of
, but its virtual inaccessibility to West
ern scholars and military analysts makes
this electronic republication critically necessary.
The continued relevance of
The Quranic Concept of War
is indicated by the discovery
by US military officials of summaries of th
is book published in various languages on
captured and killed
insurgents in Afghanistan.
This is hardly a surprising
development as Malik finds within the Qura
n a doctrine of aggressive, escalating
and constant
against non-Muslims and the religio
us justification of terrorism as
a means to achieving the dominance of
Islam around the world –– dogmas that
square with the Islamist ideology driving terrorism worldwide.
Equally as important as the argument for
advanced by Malik in this book are
the Forward by Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, the
late President of Pakistan and Army
Chief of Staff, and the Preface by Allah Bu
khsh K. Brohi, the late Advocate-General
of Pakistan. Their respective endorsements
of the book established Malik’’s views on
as national policy and gave his inte
rpretation official state sanction.
General Zia embraces Malik’’s expansive understanding of
as a duty extending
to individual citizens as well as soldiers;
and Brohi, drawing an explicit distinction
(the House of Islam) and
Dar al-Harb
(the House of War –– i.

The quranic concept of war. Written by a Pakistani Brigadier. If it was not approved by Islamic scholars it would never have been printed.

Maybe a terrorism expert would do better to read what the enemy says, rather than use government approved guesses.

Oh dear, that text has got pretty garbled.  We actually have a copy of that book already on 4F:


Muslim Terrorism Count

Thousands of Deadly Islamic Terror Attacks Since 9/11

Mission Overview

Most Western societies are based on Secular Democracy, which itself is based on the concept that the open marketplace of ideas leads to the optimum government. Whilst that model has been very successful, it has defects. The 4 Freedoms address 4 of the principal vulnerabilities, and gives corrections to them. 

At the moment, one of the main actors exploiting these defects, is Islam, so this site pays particular attention to that threat.

Islam, operating at the micro and macro levels, is unstoppable by individuals, hence: "It takes a nation to protect the nation". There is not enough time to fight all its attacks, nor to read them nor even to record them. So the members of 4F try to curate a representative subset of these events.

We need to capture this information before it is removed.  The site already contains sufficient information to cover most issues, but our members add further updates when possible.

We hope that free nations will wake up to stop the threat, and force the separation of (Islamic) Church and State. This will also allow moderate Muslims to escape from their totalitarian political system.

The 4 Freedoms

These 4 freedoms are designed to close 4 vulnerabilities in Secular Democracy, by making them SP or Self-Protecting (see Hobbes's first law of nature). But Democracy also requires - in addition to the standard divisions of Executive, Legislature & Judiciary - a fourth body, Protector of the Open Society (POS), to monitor all its vulnerabilities (see also Popper). 
1. SP Freedom of Speech
Any speech is allowed - except that advocating the end of these freedoms
2. SP Freedom of Election
Any party is allowed - except one advocating the end of these freedoms
3. SP Freedom of Movement
The government can import new voters - except where that changes the political demographics (i.e. electoral fraud by means of immigration)
4. SP Freedom from Over-spending
People should not be charged for government systems which they reject, and which give them no benefit. For example, the government cannot pass a debt burden across generations (25 years).
An additional Freedom from Religion is be deducible by equal application of law: "Religious and cultural activities are exempt from legal oversight - except where they intrude into the public sphere (Res Publica)"

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